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OPINION 
                    
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 The question presented in this case is whether various 
state-law claims against a bankruptcy trustee in his individual 
capacity can be either a "core" bankruptcy proceeding under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) ("matters concerning the administration of 
the estate") or a noncore, related proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 
§158(c)(2).  The plaintiff alleged that the trustee negligently 
lost or intentionally stole property that at one time was in the 
estate's possession, but was never "property of the [bankrupt] 
estate," as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 541.  Both the bankruptcy 
court and the district court below held that such a case was a 
"core proceeding," which the bankruptcy court had the power to 
decide, subject to ordinary appellate review.   
 As it is uncontroverted that the property alleged to 
have been lost or stolen by the trustee (a painting held by the 
debtor in its capacity as a bailee) was never "property of the 
estate," as defined by § 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, and as 
it is equally undisputed that the outcome of appellant's suit 
against the trustee would have no effect on the bankrupt estate, 
we conclude that this case is neither a core proceeding nor a 
noncore, related proceeding under controlling precedent.  Because 
the courts below lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
appellant's actions against the trustee, we will reverse the 
order of the district court entered March 31, 1995, and remand 
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this matter to the district court with instructions that it 
remand the matter back to the bankruptcy court with a direction 
that the bankruptcy court dismiss the complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.   
I. 
 The Guild and Gallery Plus, Inc., ("the Gallery") filed 
a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code while the 
Gallery was in possession of seventeen paintings owned by 
appellant John B. Torkelsen.  Torkelsen had sent these paintings 
to the Gallery for storage while renovations were being done on 
his home.  One of the paintings was entitled "Summertime--
Collecting Wild Flowers--1902" by Peter Mark Monstadt ("the 
Summertime painting").     
 On December 7, 1991, after the Chapter 11 petition had 
been filed, Torkelsen sent his fiancee, Pamela Rogers, his 
attorney, Penny Bennett, his brother, his son and an unidentified 
third man ("the Torkelsen party") to the Gallery in order to 
remove all seventeen paintings and bring them back to him.  When 
the Torkelsen party arrived at the Gallery, Anton Borics, who 
supervised the Gallery on behalf of the trustee, Carmen J. 
Maggio, opposed the removal of the paintings.  Alarmed, Borics 
contacted Maggio by phone.  Maggio also objected to the removal 
of the paintings.  Nonetheless, when it became clear that the 
Torkelsen party was determined to remove all of the paintings 
immediately, Maggio agreed, albeit under duress, that the 
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paintings could be removed.1  Maggio insisted, however, that the 
Torkelsen party provide him with a written list of everything 
that had been removed from the Gallery.  
 Pursuant to Maggio's request, attorney Penny Bennett 
prepared a receipt for the paintings that had been removed from 
the Gallery on December 7.  Attorney Bennett, Pamela Rogers and 
Julie Lapitino, a Gallery employee, signed the receipt.  It 
provided that "The undersigned hereby acknowledge that seventeen 
(17) pieces of art owned by John Torkelsen were removed from the 
Guild Gallery on this day.  The undersigned have confirmed that 
the attached inventory dated June 12, 1991, entitled Guild 
Gallery, accurately lists and identifies the seventeen pieces of 
art concerned."  App. at 480. 
 Shortly thereafter, Torkelsen conducted an unsuccessful 
search for the Summertime painting.  Torkelsen assumed that the 
painting had been left behind at the Gallery.  In a letter dated 
December 9, 1991, Torkelsen's attorney requested that Maggio 
return the Summertime painting.  Maggio responded by advising 
counsel to file the appropriate motion.  On December 20, 1991, 
Torkelsen filed a motion for reclamation of property seeking to 
recover the Summertime painting. 
 On December 27, 1991, Maggio instructed Gallery 
employee Diane Lane to search for the Summertime painting in the 
                                                           
1Removal of the paintings at this time violated the automatic 
stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
Pursuant to a Consent Order entered April 10, 1992, Torkelsen 
agreed to pay $8,000.00 in attorneys' fees to the trustee and 
$1,000.00 in punitive damages to the General Estate Fund for 
having violated the automatic stay. 
5 
Gallery's storage areas.  On the same day, Lane claimed to have 
located the Summertime painting at the Gallery.  On January 7, 
1992, based upon Lane's representation, Borics wrote Maggio a 
letter advising him that the Gallery was still in possession of 
one of Torkelsen's paintings.  Maggio then agreed, by consent 
order dated March 16, 1992 ("Consent Order"), to return the 
Summertime painting.  The Consent Order provided that the trustee 
would "abandon, turn over and arrange for movant to retrieve 
`Summertime--Collecting Flowers--1902' by Peter Mark Monstadt, 
within 10 days from the date hereof. . . . "  App. at 450. 
 After the bankruptcy court had approved the Consent 
Order, the Summertime painting could not be located.  Unable to 
retrieve his property, Torkelsen filed an adversary complaint 
against Maggio in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New 
Jersey "seeking damages for the loss of the `Summertime' painting 
based on theories of wrongful possession, negligence, res ipsa 
loquitur, bailment, conversion and breach of warranty."  In re 
Guild & Gallery, No. 94-5619, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 
1995).  Maggio filed a counterclaim seeking to:  (1) vacate the 
Consent Order due to mistake of fact;  (2) require Torkelsen to 
defray any loss by collecting insurance proceeds covering the 
Summertime painting;  and (3) recover damages against Torkelsen 
resulting from the trespass that occurred on December 7, 1991. 
 On August 16-17, 1994, this case was tried.  On the day 
before the trial commenced, a conference call was held in which 
the court and counsel for both parties participated.  During this 
conversation, the court informed the parties that since all of 
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Torkelsen's claims against the trustee hinged upon the factual 
contention that the Summertime painting remained in the Gallery 
after December 7, 1991, the court would hear the parties' 
evidence on this specific issue and make a finding of fact before 
other matters would be considered.  Counsel for both parties 
consented to this arrangement. 
 On August 17, 1994, the bankruptcy court found that 
Torkelsen had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the Summertime painting remained at the Gallery after December 7, 
1991.  In reaching this decision, the court "placed significance, 
among other things, . . . on the credibility of the witnesses 
that [it] had the opportunity to observe. . . . "  App. at 441-
42.  The bankruptcy court did not find Diane Lane's testimony to 
be convincing.  On the issue of whether Lane had identified the 
Summertime painting in the Gallery on December 27, the court 
noted Lane's "subsequent doubt and contradictory testimony" and 
her inability "to confirm that the painting that she saw on 
December 27th was, in fact, Summertime."  Id. at 437.  Thus, the 
court concluded that any statements by Maggio, Borics or the 
trustee's attorney that the Summertime painting had been located 
in the Gallery after December 7 were based solely upon their 
erroneous belief about the accuracy of Lane's report. 
 As for the receipt which certified that seventeen 
paintings had been removed, the bankruptcy court noted that the 
three women who signed the receipt on December 7, 1991, had 
testified to their belief in its accuracy on that date. Moreover, 
the court observed that at least two of the women had compared 
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the list, double-checked it, and concluded that all of 
Torkelsen's paintings had been accounted for, including the 
Summertime painting. 
 On August 17, 1994, the bankruptcy court granted the 
first count of Maggio's counterclaim seeking to vacate the 
Consent Order on the ground that it was based upon a mistake of 
fact.  All of Torkelsen's claims against Maggio were dismissed 
with prejudice.  Maggio's remaining counterclaims also were 
dismissed with prejudice. 
 On September 6, 1994, Torkelsen filed a motion with the 
bankruptcy court seeking to have the bankruptcy judge recuse 
himself from the case before a final order was entered.  On 
September 26, a hearing was held on the recusal motion.  The 
motion was denied the following day.  The bankruptcy court's 
final order dismissing all of Torkelsen's claims was entered on 
October 11, 1994.2 
 Torkelsen appealed to the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey.  By order dated March 31, 1995, 
the district court affirmed all aspects of the bankruptcy court's 
decision.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 Jurisdiction over Title 11 matters "lies with the 
district court.  However, the district court routinely refers 
most bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy court."  In re Marcus 
                                                           
2Since this case is to be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, we 
express no view on the question whether the bankruptcy court's 
factual finding that the Summertime painting was removed from the 
Gallery on December 7, 1991, was clearly erroneous. 
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Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 264 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(citation omitted).  See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).  "It is well-settled 
that the bankruptcy court potentially has jurisdiction over four 
types of title 11 matters, pending referral from the district 
court:  (1) cases under title 11, (2) proceedings arising under 
title 11, (3) proceedings arising in a case under title 11, and 
(4) proceedings related to a case under title 11."  Marcus Hook, 
943 F.2d at 264.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1334.  We have jurisdiction to 
review the final order of the district court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Although neither party has challenged the bankruptcy 
and district courts' jurisdiction to adjudicate Torkelsen's 
claims, "we are obligated to do so on our own motion if a 
question thereto exists."  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 
U.S. 737, 740, 96 S. Ct. 1202, 1204 (1976).  "An appellate court 
must satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also of 
the jurisdiction of the courts under review."  Pomper v. 
Thompson, 836 F.2d 131, 132 (3d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing 
Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 55 S. Ct. 162 (1934)).  "[W]e 
cannot ignore matters that bring into question the existence of 
federal jurisdiction."  Thermice Corp. v. Vistron Corp., 832 F.2d 




 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) provides that "Bankruptcy judges 
may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core 
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proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under 
title 11. . . . "  Section 157(b)(2) sets forth a nonexhaustive 
listing of core proceedings.  In the instant case, we must decide 
whether Torkelsen's claims against the trustee fall within the 
scope of § 157(b)(2)(A);  that is, "matters concerning the 
administration of the estate."  In order to develop an 
understanding of the genesis and purpose of the distinction 
between core and noncore proceedings under the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("1984 Act"), Pub. 
L. No. 98-353, Title I, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 333 (1984), it is 
instructive to look to the Acts of Congress that preceded the 
promulgation of the 1984 Act as well as current Supreme Court 
doctrine on the power of Article I bankruptcy courts to hear and 
decide cases.   
 For eighty years, bankruptcy court jurisdiction was 
governed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 
(1898).  One commentator has described the jurisdictional scheme 
of the 1898 Act in the following terms: 
 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 vested original 
jurisdiction over all bankruptcy matters in the United 
States District Courts.  In turn, the district judges 
referred certain matters to bankruptcy referees.  There 
were two main types of bankruptcy matters under the Act 
of 1898:  "proceedings" and "controversies." 
"Proceedings" generally involved the administration of 
the bankrupt's estate and were solely within the 
province of the bankruptcy court.  "Controversies" were 
collateral disputes arising out of bankruptcy 
proceedings.  These matters involved the trustee and 
third parties and could be heard by either the 
bankruptcy court or by a non-bankruptcy court that had 
jurisdiction.  While proceedings fell within the 
"summary jurisdiction" of the bankruptcy court, 
controversies sometimes required the court to exercise 
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"plenary jurisdiction."  The two types of jurisdiction 
differed in the following manner.  Matters within the 
summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court could be 
adjudicated through the use of more expeditious modes 
of procedure, with the court sitting in equity.  The 
district court qua bankruptcy court could hear these 
matters;  however, a bankruptcy referee usually 
rendered final judgment on such matters, subject only 
to "review" by the district court.  In contrast, 
plenary jurisdiction was exercised only by the district 
court or state courts, following their general rules of 
procedure.  According to some estimates, as much as 
fifty percent of all litigation under the Act of 1898 
concerned whether the matter was within the bankruptcy 
court's summary jurisdiction. 
 
Thomas S. Marion, Core Proceedings and "New" Bankruptcy 
Jurisdiction, 35 DePaul L. Rev. 675, 676-77 (1986) (hereinafter 
New Bankruptcy Jurisdiction).  Under appropriate circumstances, 
we may look to cases decided under the 1898 Act for guidance in 
determining whether a matter is a core proceeding.  See Beard v. 
Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 In 1978, Congress sought to establish a more efficient 
bankruptcy scheme that would avoid the confusion inherent in the 
summary/plenary distinction.  Through the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 
(1978), Congress made an attempt to  
centralize bankruptcy jurisdiction and expedite the 
administration of bankruptcy cases . . . . The Reform 
Act conferred on district courts original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over all "cases" under title 11.  It also 
gave district courts original and concurrent 
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising from or 
related to cases under title 11.  In turn, the Reform 
Act gave the bankruptcy courts "all of the jurisdiction 
conferred by [the Reform Act] on the district courts." 
This comprised jurisdiction over any action involving 
the debtor, including many actions that would have 
required a plenary suit under the Act of 1898.  Eighty 
years of litigation over the summary-plenary 
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distinction were abandoned in favor of a simplified 
bankruptcy court system. 
 
Marion, New Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra, at 678.  See Hays & 
Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 
1149, 1159 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he dichotomy between plenary and 
summary jurisdiction" was "the evil the Reform Act was designed 
to address.").  The Supreme Court, however, in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. 
Ct. 2858 (1982) (plurality opinion), struck down the more 
efficient jurisdictional scheme of the 1978 Act.  The Marathon 
Court held that the power the 1978 Act purported to delegate to 
Article I bankruptcy judges violated Article III, § 1 of the 
Constitution.          
 The facts underlying the Marathon case are as follows. 
In January 1980, Northern Pipeline filed a Chapter 11 
reorganization petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Minnesota.  Two months later Northern Pipeline filed suit 
against Marathon seeking damages for alleged breaches of contract 
and warranty, as well as for alleged misrepresentation, coercion, 
and duress.  The parties involved were not diverse, nor did the 
case present a substantial federal question.  The only nexus 
between Northern Pipeline's claims and the bankruptcy was the 
fact that Northern Pipeline was a debtor in a Chapter 11 business 
reorganization. 
 The Marathon Court held that an Article I bankruptcy 
court could not exercise "The judicial Power" over Northern 
Pipeline's contract and fraud claims.  The plurality observed 
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that "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at 
the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished 
from the adjudication of state-created private rights, such as 
the right to recover damages that is at issue in this case."  Id. 
at 71, 102 S. Ct. at 2871.  The plurality was unimpressed with 
the conduit notion of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, pursuant 
to which jurisdiction was first granted to the district court and 
then transferred to the bankruptcy courts.  Justice Brennan 
concluded that the 1978 Act was unconstitutional because it 
impermissibly vested "all `essential attributes' of the judicial 
power of the United States in the `adjunct' bankruptcy court." 
Id. at 84-85, 102 S. Ct. 2878.  
 The Supreme Court's decision in Marathon had 
potentially far-reaching implications.  In reaction to Marathon, 
Congress enacted the 1984 Act, which made important changes in 
the structure of the bankruptcy court system.  As in 
the Reform Act, the district courts are vested with 
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases 
under title 11, and original and concurrent 
jurisdiction over all proceedings arising under or 
related to title 11.  The critical difference between 
the Reform Act and the Act of 1984 is that under the 
latter, bankruptcy courts do not exercise all 
jurisdiction vested in district courts.  Instead, the 
bankruptcy court is established as a unit of the 
district court to which the district court may refer 
any or all cases and proceedings.  The district court 
may revoke this reference on its own motion or on 
timely motion of any party, for cause shown.  Thus, the 
district court, in form, has complete control over what 
actions the bankruptcy court hears.  Under the Reform 
Act, the district court had no such power. 
 
 The Act of 1984 contains additional limitations on 
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.  Proceedings are 
divided into "core proceedings" and "proceedings that 
are not core proceedings" ("non-core proceedings"). 
13 
Bankruptcy judges may hear and finally determine all 
cases under title 11 and all core proceedings, subject 
to appeal to the district court.  The bankruptcy judge 
may also hear non-core proceedings.  However, if the 
parties do not consent to final judgment in a non-core 
proceeding in bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy judge 
merely submits proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to the district judge.  If a party 
objects to a particular matter, the district judge must 
conduct a de novo review of that matter. 
 
Marion, New Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra, at 681-82.  Although 
there was some question after the 1984 Act was passed as to 
whether the new bankruptcy legislation ran afoul of Marathon, 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the Marathon 
decision narrowly.  See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural 
Prods., Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584, 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3334 (1985) 
(interpreting Marathon as holding "only that Congress may not 
vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render 
final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional 
contract action arising under state law, without consent of the 
litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review"); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 106 S. 
Ct. 3245 (1986) (same).  
2. 
 The bankruptcy court and the district court both 
concluded that this case was a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 
§157(b)(2)(A) ("matters concerning the administration of the 
estate").  Both the district court and the bankruptcy court read 
this section too broadly.   
 Our circuit precedents have "held that a proceeding is 
core under section 157 if it invokes a substantive right provided 
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by title 11 or if it is a proceeding that, by its nature, could 
arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case."  In re Marcus 
Hook Dev. Park Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  In support of its ruling 
that this case was a core proceeding, the bankruptcy court 
relied, inter alia, on the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit in In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987), 
which observed that 
the phrases "arising under" and "arising in" are 
helpful indicators of the meaning of core proceedings. 
If the proceeding involves a right created by the 
federal bankruptcy law, it is a core proceeding;  for 
example, an action by the trustee to avoid a 
preference.  If the proceeding is one that would arise 
only in bankruptcy, it is also a core proceeding;  for 
example, the filing of a proof of claim or an objection 
to the discharge of a particular debt.  If the 
proceeding does not invoke a substantive right created 
by the federal bankruptcy law and is one that could 
exist outside of bankruptcy it is not a core 
proceeding;  it may be related to the bankruptcy 
because of its potential effect, but under section 
157(c)(1) it is an "otherwise related" or non-core 
proceeding.                  
  
Id. at 97. 
 We conclude, however, that applying this standard to 
the present matter warrants a result contrary to that reached by 
the bankruptcy court.  The claims that Torkelsen raises against 
the trustee need not "arise only in bankruptcy."  Torkelsen's 
state law claims are not comparable to the filing of a proof of 
claim or raising an objection to a discharge of a particular 
debt, the examples provided by Wood.  Moreover, Torkelsen's 
claims certainly could exist outside of bankruptcy;  they could 
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all be filed in a state court.  The same analysis is supported by 
our own Circuit precedents.  This case is not a core proceeding 
because Torkelsen's claims neither "invoke[] a substantive right 
provided by title 11," nor could this action "arise only in the 
context of a bankruptcy case."  Marcus Hook, 943 F.2d at 267. See 
In re Gardner, 913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) 
("Actions which do not depend on the bankruptcy laws for their 
existence and which could proceed in another court are not core 
proceedings."). 
  B. 
 The language of § 157(b)(2)(A) would appear to 
encompass an extraordinarily broad number of claims.  Indeed, the 
Editor-in-Chief of Collier's has commented that "[w]hile estate 
administration matters are not defined, the clause appears to 
contemplate a very broad panoply of proceedings integral to a 
case under the Code.  Its overbreadth may, in fact, render the 
remaining clauses unnecessary."  Lawrence P. King, Symposium on 
Bankruptcy:  Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy 
Amendments of 1984, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 675, 688 (1986).   
 Even if we were to interpret the language of 
§157(b)(2)(A) in the broadest possible manner consistent with the 
Constitution, this case still would not qualify as a core 
proceeding.   Assuming arguendo that Maggio engaged in all of the 
conduct that Torkelsen alleges and that such conduct was 
administrative in nature, our inquiry under § 157(b)(2)(A) does 
not end there.  Section 157(b)(2)(A) refers to "matters 
concerning the administration of the estate."  Since it is 
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uncontroverted that the Summertime painting is not part of the 
bankrupt estate, the trustee's alleged misconduct does not fall 
within the plain language of this provision. 
 Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, which defines the 
parameters of the bankrupt estate, compels this result.  Property 
of the estate includes "wherever located and by whomever held[,] 
. . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property 
as of the commencement of the case."  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  The 
legislative history of § 541 describes the expansive reach of 
this provision: 
Under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), the estate is 
comprised of all legal and equitable interests of the 
debtor in property, wherever located, as of the 
commencement of the case.  The scope of this paragraph 
is broad.  It includes all kinds of property, including 
tangible or intangible property, causes of action, . . 
. as well as property recovered by the trustee under 
section 542 . . . if the property recovered is merely 
out of the possession of the debtor, yet remained 
"property of the debtor."  The debtor's interest in 
property also includes "title" to property, which is an 
interest, just as are a possessory interest, or 
leasehold interest, for example. 
 
S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868. 
 The Supreme Court affirmed the broad scope of 
§541(a)(1) in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 
103 S. Ct. 2309 (1983).  After citing the definition of "estate" 
articulated in § 541 and describing the powers of the trustee 
with regard to the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 363, the Court 
observed that "[a]lthough these statutes could be read to limit 
the estate to those `interests of the debtor in property' at the 
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time of the filing of the petition," the Court "view[ed] them as 
a definition of what is included in the estate, rather than a 
limitation."  Id. at 203, 103 S. Ct. at 2312.  The Court stated 
that "[b]oth the congressional goal of encouraging 
reorganizations and Congress' choice of methods to protect 
secured creditors suggest that Congress intended a broad range of 
property to be included in the estate."  Id. at 204, 103 S. Ct. 
at 2313. 
 Justice Blackmun's opinion also provided examples of 
property interests that do not fall within the scope of § 541. 
The Court observed that the legislative history of § 541 
"indicates that Congress intended to exclude from the estate 
property of others in which the debtor had some minor interest 
such as a lien or bare legal title."  Id. at 205 n.8, 103 S. Ct. 
at 2314 n.8.  The Court further stated that "[w]e do not now 
decide the outer boundaries of the bankruptcy estate.  We note 
only that Congress plainly excluded property of others held by 
the debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the petition." 
Id. at 205 n.10, 103 S. Ct. at 2314 n. 10. 
 The Gallery estate held Torkelsen's paintings as a 
bailee.  Collier's describes the manner in which bailments should 
be analyzed under § 541: 
[I]t became well settled under the Bankruptcy Act that 
absent state statutory enactment to the contrary, if 
property was in the debtor's hands as bailee. . ., the 
trustee held it as such, and the bailor . . . could 
recover the property or its proceeds.  Under the Code, 
section 362 will automatically stay the bailor . . . 
from divesting the debtor of possession, and the estate 




4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 541.08[2], at 42-43 (15th ed. 1995) 
(emphasis added).  See Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d 
1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he automatic stay was intended to 
apply to actions that do not necessarily involve property of the 
estate."). 
 Pursuant to this analysis, the debtor's rights under 
the bailment agreement, i.e., whatever funds Torkelsen owed to 
the estate pursuant to the bailment agreement, would fall within 
the definition of "property of the estate."3  The Summertime 
painting itself, however, was not property of the estate, even 
under the expansive definition set forth in § 541 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The estate had no security interest in the 
painting.  Upon satisfaction of bailment agreement, the painting-
-which the estate never claimed as its own--had to be returned. 
This understanding was formalized in the Consent Order.  Since 
the Summertime painting was not part of the bankrupt estate, then 
a fortiori this matter cannot fall within § 157(b)(2)(A), which 
can only be applied to matters concerning the administration of 
the bankrupt estate. 
 At oral argument before this court, Maggio argued that 
although the Summertime painting was not part of the bankrupt 
estate, this proceeding is nonetheless a core matter concerning 
estate administration because prior to the bankruptcy court's 
approval of the Consent Order on March 16, 1992, no formal 
                                                           
3The specifics of the bailment agreement between Torkelsen and 
the Gallery are not part of the record. 
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adjudication had been made regarding the issue of who owned the 
Summertime painting.  Thus, the argument goes, any alleged 
wrongdoing up until that time would still fall within the scope 
of § 157(b)(2)(A). 
 This argument must be rejected.  The plain language of 
§ 157(b)(2)(A) applies only to property of the bankrupt estate. 
Torkelsen petitioned the bankruptcy court for a determination 
that the Summertime painting was his property and obtained the 
benefit of a court order confirming that fact on March 16, 1992. 
Maggio cannot now, in the face of a conclusive legal 
determination that the Summertime painting is not property of the 
estate, argue that Torkelsen's claims--which have no bearing upon 
the estate whatsoever--nonetheless fall within the provision of 
the Bankruptcy Code that by its terms applies only to the 
administration of estate property.  See Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. 
v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Whatever else a 
core proceeding must be, it must involve a decision that 
ultimately affects the distribution of the debtor's assets."). 
 Torkelsen seeks nothing from the Gallery estate itself. 
Torkelsen's action in no way implicates "the restructuring of 
debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal 
bankruptcy power. . . . "  Marathon, 458 U.S. at 71, 102 S. Ct. 
at 2871.  Moreover, as Marathon illustrates, even if the estate 
has a direct financial interest in a claim that a party proposes 
to litigate in bankruptcy court, this fact, by itself, does not 
provide an adequate jurisdictional foundation.  That the estate 
has no interest, financial or otherwise, in the outcome of the 
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dispute between Torkelsen and the trustee renders Maggio's 
argument that this is a core proceeding untenable.  We therefore 
conclude that the actions that Torkelsen brought against the 
trustee were not core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). 
  IV. 
 It remains to be determined, therefore, whether this 
case is nevertheless a noncore, related proceeding.  The 
applicable test to determine whether an action brought in 
bankruptcy court qualifies as a noncore, related proceeding was 
set forth in the landmark decision of Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 
F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984).  The Pacor court held that "the test for 
determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy 
is whether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have 
any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy."  Id. 
at 994.  The court further observed that "the proceeding need not 
necessarily be against the debtor or against the debtor's 
property.  An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome 
could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom 
of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way 
impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt 
estate."  Id.  Furthermore, "the mere fact that there may be 
common issues of fact between a civil proceeding and a 
controversy involving the bankruptcy estate does not bring the 
matter within the scope of section 1471(b).4  Judicial economy 
itself does not justify federal jurisdiction."  Id.  See In re 
                                                           
428 U.S.C. § 1471 is the precursor of 28 U.S.C. § 1334.  The same 
analysis applies.  See Marcus Hook, 943 F.2d at 264 n.4.   
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Bobroff, 766 F.2d 797, 802 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument 
that "related to" jurisdiction "is intended to mirror the 
principle of pendent jurisdiction");  see generally Susan Block-
Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:  A 
Constitutional, Statutory, And Policy Analysis, 62 Fordham L. 
Rev. 721 (1994). 
 The test that Judge Garth articulated in Pacor has been 
enormously influential.  Pacor not only governs our analysis 
here, but its cogent analytical framework has been relied upon by 
our sister circuits more than any other case in this area of the 
law.  The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have 
adopted Pacor without modification.  See  In re Lemco Gypsum, 
Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 1990) ("We join the majority 
of the circuits that have adopted the Pacor formulation.");  In 
re Fietz, 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1988) ("We . . . adopt the 
Pacor definition. . . . We reject any limitation on this 
definition;  to the extent that other circuits may limit 
jurisdiction where the Pacor decision would not, we stand by 
Pacor.");  Wood, 825 F.2d at 93 ("Courts have articulated various 
definitions of `related,' but the definition of the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit appears to have the most support. . 
. We adopt it as our own.");  In re Dogpatch U.S.A., Inc., 810 
F.2d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1987) (adopting the Pacor test);  A.H. 
Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1002 n.11 (4th Cir.) ("The 
accepted definition of the `related to' in these statutes is that 
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declared in Pacor. . . ."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876, 107 S. 
Ct. 251 (1986).5 
 We elaborated upon Pacor in In re Marcus Hook.  There, 
we stated that "[a] key word in [the Pacor test] is conceivable. 
Certainty, or even likelihood, is not a requirement.  Bankruptcy 
jurisdiction will exist so long as it is possible that a 
proceeding may impact on the debtor's rights, liabilities, 
options, or freedom of action or the handling and administration 
of the bankrupt estate."  Marcus Hook, 943 F.2d at 264 (emphasis 
added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).    
 Torkelsen's cause of action against the trustee does 
not satisfy the requirements for relatedness set forth in Pacor. 
As previously mentioned, the Summertime painting was not the 
property of the bankrupt estate.  "If the action does not involve 
property of the estate, then not only is it a noncore proceeding, 
it is an unrelated matter completely beyond the bankruptcy 
court's subject-matter jurisdiction."  In re Gallucci, 931 F.2d 
738, 742 (11th Cir. 1991).  See Bobroff, 766 F.2d at 804 
(debtor's tort claims that did not accrue until after the filing 
of the bankruptcy petition were not "property of the estate;" 
therefore, "the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
                                                           
5Even for those circuits that have not formally adopted Pacor, 
Judge Garth's opinion has provided an indispensable and 
frequently cited frame of reference, a veritable beacon on the 
uncharted and perilous waters of bankruptcy subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The references to Pacor in Shepard's Citations are 
legion.  When federal courts must consider whether an issue is a 
related proceeding, the starting point has universally been 
Pacor.               
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adjudicate them as being `related to' the debtor's bankruptcy 
proceeding").   
 Neither party has satisfactorily demonstrated how the 
claims that Torkelsen has asserted involving the trustee's 
handling of Torkelsen's property could possibly have any bearing 
upon the estate being administered in bankruptcy.  Nor would any 
judgment obtained have any "effect on the arrangement, standing, 
or priorities of [the estate's] creditors."  Pacor, 743 F.2d at 
995-96.  All of Torkelsen's claims are asserted only against the 
trustee in his "individual capacit[y], and there is no claim of 
vicarious liability on the part of the debtors or the estate." 
Howell Hydrocarbons, 897 F.2d at 190.  The ultimate disposition 
of Torkelsen's claims would not impact upon the Gallery's 
"rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action or the 
handling and administration of the bankrupt estate."  Marcus 
Hook, 943 F.2d at 264 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).     
 Torkelsen argues, however, that this case is a related, 
noncore matter because the Consent Order directing Maggio to 
return the painting to Torkelsen and the trustee's failure to do 
so affected the handling and administration of the bankrupt 
estate.  Torkelsen also maintains that "Maggio's status as a 
trustee was sufficient to create bankruptcy court jurisdiction. . 
. ."  Appellant's Reply Br. at 6.  Both of these contentions must 
be rejected.  Torkelsen's argument that the Consent Order can be 
utilized to support a finding of subject matter jurisdiction over 
claims that otherwise could not be heard in bankruptcy court is 
24 
without merit.  Pacor cannot be read to countenance this sort of 
bootstrapping.  At a minimum, Marathon requires that all claims 
filed in bankruptcy court must be able to stand on their own as 
either core or related proceedings.        
 Torkelsen's alternate assertion that Maggio's status as 
trustee was sufficient to create bankruptcy court jurisdiction 
must also be rejected.  Surely not every suit against a trustee, 
regardless of how tenuous its connection to a bankrupt estate, 
automatically confers jurisdiction simply because the trustee is 
named as a party.  See In re McKinney, 45 B.R. 790, 792 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ky. 1985) (Subject matter jurisdiction is not "created by 
the fact that the trustee holds his office by court 
appointment."). 
 Discussing the current boundaries of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction, one commentator has observed that 
despite the expansion of bankruptcy jurisdiction, that 
jurisdiction is still sharply limited. . . [T]he limits 
of the system's jurisdiction are defined by reference 
to a res. . . The res in question is not a particular 
piece of property;  it is the debtor's financial 
affairs. . . Proceedings affecting the res are within 
the court's jurisdiction;  proceedings not affecting 
the res are not. 
 
Richard H. Gibson, Home Court, Outpost Court:  Reconciling 
Bankruptcy Case Control With Venue Flexibility in Proceedings, 62 
Am. Bankr. L.J. 37, 64 (1988).  Torkelsen's actions against the 
trustee, wherever they may proceed, would have no impact upon the 
financial affairs of the bankrupt estate.  See Gallucci, 931 F.2d 
at 742 (noting the "general principle of bankruptcy law" that "if 
the resolution of litigation cannot affect the administration of 
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the estate, the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to 
decide it").  
   Since the claims asserted here fail to satisfy the 
Pacor standard, the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear Torkelsen's state-law claims against the 
bankruptcy trustee.  We therefore will reverse the district 
court's March 31, 1995, order and remand this matter to the 
district court.  The district court will be instructed to further 
remand the matter to the bankruptcy court with a direction that 
the case be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
